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William Pyle and Koen Schoors 
 
 
A ‘de Soto Effect’ in Industry?  






Russia‟s tremendous inter-regional variation in the pace of industrial land rights reform has 
meant that geography has helped determine the current tenure status of firms‟ production 
plots as much as any individual firm characteristics. By exploiting both this difference in 
the pace with which land reform has been carried out across Russia‟s federal subjects and a 
unique micro-level dataset, we present evidence strongly consistent with the proposition 
that more secure rights to land facilitate access to external financing. This finding is con-
firmed by other evidence from the survey that points to private land serving as an impor-
tant source of collateral for Russian lenders and borrowers.  
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William Pyle and Koen Schoors 
 
 
A ‘de Soto Effect’ in Industry?  






Maareformin eteneminen hyvin eritahtisesti Venäjän eri alueilla on johtanut siihen, että 
yritysten maanomistusoloihin vaikuttavat  yhtä lailla niin maantiede kuin  yrityskohtaiset 
muuttujatkin.  Tutkimuksessa  käytetään  hyväksi  tätä  teollisuusyritysten  käyttämän  maan 
omistusolojen alueellista vaihtelua sekä ainutlaatuista yritystason aineistoa ja osoitetaan, 
että vakaat maanomistusolot helpottavat ulkopuolisen rahoituksen saamista. Lisäksi osoite-
taan, että maaomaisuus on merkittävä vakuus lainanantajille. 
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1  Introduction 
 
Over the past two decades, the establishment of more secure rights over land has become 
one of the most widely discussed policy prescriptions for reducing financial market fric-
tions in low and middle income countries.   Its popularity is most frequently associated 
with the Peruvian economist, Hernando de Soto, whose advocacy efforts and book, The 
Mystery of Capital, prompted Bill Clinton to describe him as the “world‟s leading econo-
mist.”  Now translated into thirty languages, the book engages one of the biggest questions 
in economics – why some nations are rich while others remain poor. De Soto argues that 
the critical difference is the extension of widespread private land tenure (and the institu-
tional infrastructure to support it), which promotes development by facilitating the use of 
land as collateral. Though skeptically received in some quarters, academic interest in his 
thesis has been appreciable and, indeed, pre-dates De Soto‟s campaign.1 The work of eco-
nomic historians (North, 1990) and, more recently, the application of clever instruments 
for identifying modern growth‟s distant institutional origins (Acemoglu et al., 2001) has 
increased appreciation for the potential impact of secure property rights to productive as-
sets, generally, and land, specifically.  In addition to economic histories and macro-level 
analyses, applied microeconomists have devoted increasing attention to the effect of more 
secure land rights. Some have explored the link between land tenure and credit market ac-
cess  (Place  and  Migot-Adholla,  1998;  Carter,  Michael  and  Pedro  Olinto,  2003;  Field, 
2006); others have looked at the more general relationship between the strength of tenure 
rights and investment activity (Alston et al., 1996; Besley, 1995; Braselle et al., 2002; Do 
and Iyer, 2008; Field, 2005; Galiani and Schargrodsky, 2010; Hornbeck, 2010; Jacoby et 
al., 2002). All such analyses, however, have concentrated on actors  -- frontier settlers, 
small farmers in poor countries and the residents of urban slums – for whom the value of 
contiguous capital assets is relatively small. There are no investigations in the literature of 
economic actors whose land lies underneath complex capital assets. In this paper, we take 
advantage of unique micro-data from  a survey  of large urban enterprises  and a quasi-
experiment occasioned by the uneven rollout of Russia‟s industrial land reform to explore 
whether or not the “de Soto effect” finds support in an industrial setting.2  
                                                 
1 See Woodruff (2001) for a review of Mystery of Capital. 
2 Acknowledging his role in highlighting the capital market consequences of more secure property rights, one 
soon-to-be-published pithily described the relationship as the “De Soto effect” (Besley et al., forthcoming). William Pyle and Koen Schoors  A ‘de Soto Effect’ in Industry? 
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Though Russia launched privatization rapidly in the 1990s, it often goes unrecog-
nized that the land underneath former state owned enterprises was not touched by the pro-
gram. Russia, that is, followed a different path than the  many Central and Eastern Euro-
pean countries. Rather than simultaneously privatizing enterprise capital and land, privati-
zation initially applied only to equipment, buildings and other structures. Land plots re-
mained state-owned. A fundamental principle of market economies that the ownership of 
surface objects derives from ownership of the land underneath (superficies solo cedit) was 
thus ignored.3 Today, however, a cursory study of Russia‟s industrial land reveals a patch-
work quilt of tenure rights. Particularly over the past decade, some regions have responded 
to federal initiatives to liberalize land rights and allocation mechanisms; others, in spite of 
the federal pressure, have proceeded much more slowly, if at all.  Geographic accident has 
thus determined, in part, whether private firms have taken ownership of its production 
plot(s).  Presently, industrial enterprises operate under one of three land tenure regimes. 
Some have formal private title to their land; some lease, making regular rental payments to 
government agencies; and yet others continue to occupy their land under the old Soviet-era 
legal framework.  
Issues surrounding land tenure seem to have been all but forgotten in commentary 
on Russia‟s industrial privatization.4 This is odd. Considering the centrality of industry to 
Soviet-era urban development, some of the choicest real estate in Russia‟s largest cities is 
given over to industry (Bertaud and Renaud, 1997).5 Further, since the non -competitive 
technologies in use at many Soviet enterprises on the eve of market -oriented reforms, it 
does not strike us as unreasonable that land accounted for a substantial share of enterprise 
asset value when privatization was launched.  Although this point has been overlooked by 
most commentators on Russia‟s privatization, the split of ownership rights over comple-
                                                 
3 Expediency, not ignorance nor special Russian sensitivities to land tenure issues, seems to have been the 
main motive. The potential complexities of resolving property boundaries and the perceived need to develop 
parallel legislation on title registration and a land cadastre struck the architects of Russia‟s privatization pro-
gram as potentially too time consuming given the priority they placed, largely for political reasons, on speed. 
4 For example, see any of the  Russia-focused empirical studies referenced in the widely-cited literature re-
view of Estrin et al. (2009). Even though several speculate as to why privatization seems not to have pro-
duced the desired results in Russia, none note the potential role of the ambiguous rights over light.    
5 The Soviet economic model emphasized rapid urbanization and built up population centers whose spatial 
distribution came to look little like those elsewhere in the world. Because of th e suppression of markets and 
the priorities of planners, a disproportionately large share of urban land was given over to industry Though 
this pattern persisted into the post-Soviet era, evidence has been accumulating that as the share of industry in 
the economy declines and as state control over valuable urban land is weakening, the allocation of space 
across different economic uses is changing (Makharova and Molodikova, 2007; Molodikova and Makhrova, 
2007). BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
BOFIT Discussion Papers 33/ 2011 
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mentary land and capital assets was recognized by Boycko et al., (1995) as a possible hin-
drance to enterprise restructuring given the potential for rent-seeking officials to translate 
land control rights into opportunities to enrich themselves and/or pursue political objec-
tives.  
The vagueness of [land] lease contracts offer[s] individual bureaucrats both 
power over businesses and a steady source of income from bribes … [They 
may use their] control over land to influence privatized industrial firms, in-
sisting that they continue to pay for social services and main employment.   
 
The concern expressed here, and echoed widely in the literature on the importance of prop-
erty rights to economic development, is that weak land rights may shorten the effective 
time horizons of enterprise owners and thereby discourage potentially productive invest-
ments.6  
A related concern is that weak land rights limit the growth of capital markets by 
restricting the assets that can be used as collateral and thus, perhaps, increasing borrower 
moral hazard. One recently-published study, which argued that the “collateral variable … 
has been vastly ignored in prior empirical work” on bank lending demonstrated an increase 
in loan activity following the passage in twelve transition countries of legislation govern-
ing the pledge of land and other fixed assets as security (Hasselman et al., 2011).7 No prior 
study, however, has to our knowledge used micro-data from industrial firms to investigate 
the connection highlighted by De Soto. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly lays out changes over the past 
generation in the policies governing Russia‟s non-agricultural commercial lands and high-
lights the persistent inter-regional differences. Section 3 introduces a unique survey of 
large urban industrial enterprises. In section 4, we explore the relationship between the 
tenure status of enterprises‟ primary production plot, their self-reported ease in accessing 
credit and the intensity of their investment activity. Section 5 provides robustness checks 
and uses the survey to make a fuller case as to the validity of assumptions guiding the 
analysis. Section 6 concludes.     
                                                 
6 Otherv sources noteworthy for highlighting the importance of land include Heller (1998) and McKinsey 
Global Institute (1999). 
7 Hasselman et al. (2011) show that a one percentage point increase in the default rate increases the cost of 
collateral by 2.1 percentage points. Further, they show that the tendency of the mix of assets used as collater-
al shifts to non-firm-specific assets is less in more financially developed economies. That is, financial devel-
opment both reduces the monetary cost of collateral and expands the class of assets that can be used.  
 William Pyle and Koen Schoors  A ‘de Soto Effect’ in Industry? 
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2  Land policy at the federal and regional levels8 
 
Bucking centuries of tradition to the contrary, Russia‟s 1993 Constitution enumerated a 
right to private land ownership. But subsequent efforts to give specific form to that lan-
guage – including Presidential Decrees, chapters in the Civil Code enacted in 1994 and 
1995, and disparate pieces of legislation – produced a body of law that was seen as “in-
complete … and sometimes ambiguous” (Kaganova and O‟Leary, 1997).9 Nevertheless, 
between 1994 and 1997, an estimated 34.5 thousand hectares, across roughly 50 Russian 
federal subjects, were transferred to private enterprises.10 In May 1997, a new presidential 
decree granted regional administrations near full discretion in establishing land sale prices. 
Thereafter, land prices began to vary significantly across Russia. Over the next several 
years, the pace of enterprise land privatiz ation decreased dramatically (Kaganova, 1998; 
Limonov et al., 2001).  Since local administrations were given greater control to set lease 
rates on state-owned land than tax rates on enterprise-owned land, they had an incentive to 
make land privatization procedures complex, expensive and time consuming. In 32 re-
gions, land privatization was banned either by laws that contradicted federal legislation, by 
popular referenda, or by provisions added to the region‟s constitution.  Moscow‟s Duma, 
for instance, passed a resolution that land plots occupied by privatized enterprises could be 
leased but not sold. 
Most privatized enterprises initially held the lands they occupied under the right 
of permanent (perpetual) use, a Soviet-era form of land tenure, which granted its holder a 
right to use and build on a parcel but not to dispose of it through, for instance, sale to an-
other party. This form of land tenure, re-enumerated in the Russian Civil Code of 1995, 
was characterized as permanent only because a termination date was not specified. If the 
government did dispossess a permanent use holder of its lands, it faced a legal obligation to 
provide compensation at market value. Many Russian enterprises continue to this day to 
hold their land under permanent (perpetual) use rights; requiring them to pay a tax, deter-
mined by the land‟s assigned cadastral value, at the same rate as land owners.  
                                                 
8 This section draws on Pyle (2011) and Khakhalin and Pyle (2009). 
9 Presidential Decree 1535, issued in July 1994, spelled out procedures for acquiring the lands underneath 
privatized, non-agricultural enterprises. In conjunction with a 1995 decree that reduced the purchase price of 
enterprise-occupied land, it paved the way for a number of privatized enterprises to take ownership of their 
land plots. BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
BOFIT Discussion Papers 33/ 2011 
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A breakthrough in the enterprise land privatization process occurred in 2001 when 
the Putin administration successfully pushed through the Duma the Russian Federation 
Land  Code.  Designed  to  reinvigorate  the  process  begun  in  the  mid-1990s,  it  laid  out 
mechanisms to force divestiture of state lands under privately owned structures and to 
unify titles to land and buildings. For instance, it called for the ownership of real estate ob-
jects to henceforth follow ownership of the attached land plot; it granted exclusive right to 
purchase or lease state-owned land to the owner of the attached real estate object; it gave to 
private owners of buildings on land plots owned by other private parties the pre-emptive 
right to purchase the land; and it prohibited the future privatization of real estate objects 
without  the  concurrent  privatization  of  the  attached  plot  (Remington,  2002;  Survey  of 
Land, 2006).  
  Perhaps most notably, the Land Code sought to bring an end to the rights of 
permanent (perpetual) land use by requiring private enterprises to convert from the Soviet-
era form of land tenure to rights of ownership or lease by January 1, 2004. Further, the up-
per bound limiting the price that regional administrations could charge for enterprise land 
was reduced and their land sale legislation was to be brought into line with federal law. 
Although this legislative push did lead to an increase in the re-registration of enterprise 
land rights in many regions, its impact was not as great as anticipated. In an effective ca-
pitulation to the resistance the new provisions were encountering, the original deadline for 
converting rights of permanent use was first pushed back two years to 2006, and then again 
later to 2008. The deadline now is January 1, 2012. 
The response of sub-federal jurisdictions to the 2001 Land Code has varied tre-
mendously. In some municipalities, a substantial share of land – including parcels that 
were unimproved and those under privatized enterprises – has now been sold off to the pri-
vate sector;  in others,  such as  Moscow, the municipal  government  retains  an effective 
ownership monopoly (Kisunko and Coolidge, 2007; Survey of Land, 2006). More recently, 
the long-awaited Federal Law 212, the so-called “Major Amendments to Land Privatiza-
tion Legislation” enacted in July 2007, seemed to hold out the promise of resolving, once 
and for all, ambiguities surrounding the ownership of enterprise land. But many local ad-
ministrations continue to put up resistance. Although Law 212 laid out a new mechanism 
                                                                                                                                                    
10 This paper uses the terms Russia‟s federal subjects and regions interchangeably. The Russian Federation 
currently is comprised of 83 federal subjects (including Moscow and St. Petersburg), each with equal repre-
sentation in the Federation Council. William Pyle and Koen Schoors  A ‘de Soto Effect’ in Industry? 
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for establishing the purchase price of plots, requiring that it not exceed 2.5% of the cadas-
tral value (20% in Moscow and St. Petersburg), evidence suggests that some regions r e-
sponded by rather capriciously increasing cadastral values so as to discourage land pu r-
chases. Regional and municipal governments have also maintained an array of formal and 
informal barriers to limit competitive access to previously unused urban parcels. 11  Even 
today, the business press is filled with stories of how region -level bodies attempt to un-
dermine the intent of federal legislation (Vasilieva, 2011; Yel‟kina; Interfaks, 2011). 
Regional officials, in other words, have effectively been able to manipulate the 
“price” for privatizing a hectare of urban land. When given the discretion, as in the 1990s, 
they have done so explicitly and directly (Kisunko and Coolidge, 2007). At other times, 
when their policy autonomy has been more circumscribed, some tinkered with the “price” 
indirectly by rather capriciously raising the cadastral values that serve as the basis for a 
plot‟s price (Khakhalin and Pyle, 2009). They also have been able to raise prices implicitly 
by putting various bureaucratic obstacles in the way of firms. Regardless of the mecha-
nisms used, the regional variation in the price can be seen as exogenous to the decisions of 
individual firms.   
The reforms set in motion over the past two decades have been such that within 
urban settlements, firms now own 247.8 thousand hectares compared to 7108.0 thousand 
held by the state and municipalities. Since the passage of the 2001 Land Law, this relation-
ship between private and state lands has changed dramatically; the ratio of the former to 
the latter has grown at roughly 18% per year on average.   Indeed, looking at enterprise 
land alone, the past decade could be described as one of rapid privatization, a characteriza-
tion much at odds with the standard story that in Putin‟s Russia, privatization “stalled” and 
the share of Russia‟s GDP produced by private enterprise fell (Aslund, 2007, 251). Figure 
1 captures the six-fold increase from 2001 to 2010 of land ownership by enterprises in ur-
ban settlements and industrial lands outside of settlements.     
As suggested above, the national-level data mask a great deal of variation in the 
pace of non-agricultural land privatization across regions within Russia. Comprehensive 
data on land ownership at the level of Russia‟s eighty-plus territorial subjects is hard to 
                                                 
11 One recent analysis suggests that the inability to access land on transparent terms constitutes as big an ob-
stacle to business development in Russia as anywhere in the world (Muir and Shen, 2005). And among Rus-
sian enterprises that have direct experience with them, difficulties in acquiring land are more problematic 
than problems with bribery, the courts or access to finance, all matters that tend to receive more attention BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
BOFIT Discussion Papers 33/ 2011 
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come by. The most complete source that we have uncovered was made available on a web-
site  maintained  by  the  Federal  Agency  for  the  Real  Estate  Cadastre  (Roskadastr).12  In 
March 2009, the agency was subsumed by the Federal Service for Registration, Cadastre 
and Cartography (Rosreestr). Of the 7875.5 thousand hectares of land in urban settlements, 
the Roskadastr data designated roughly 45% (3512.2 thousand hectares) as residential-
commercial-industrial land.13 Of Moscow‟s 109.1 thousand hectares, for instance, roughly 
77% was so described, as were half of St. Petersburg‟s 139.9 thousand hectares.14  
In the absence of any indicators that describe the uses of land more finely, we in-
terpret the ratio of urban residential-commercial-industrial land owned by enterprises and 
that owned by government entities as a good measure for the pace and extent of urban in-
dustrial land privatization in a particular region.  And below, we present evidence that this 
index of urban industrial land ownership is a good proxy for the policy orientation of Rus-
sia‟s federal subjects vis-á-vis land reform. For Russia as a whole, as well as for the Cen-
tral Federal District alone, this index is 3.7.  The range across Federal Districts spans from 
a high of 4.9 in the Northwest to a low of 1.1 in the Far East. Further illustrating the varia-
tion across regions, Table 1 lists the index by territorial subject.15  In the final column of 
Table 1, we list the number of enterprises from the region that participated in the survey 




                                                                                                                                                    
(Survey of Land, 2006). Similar results have been found in research focusing on the barriers to small busi-
nesses development (Zhuravskaya et al., 2005). 
12 The website with the comprehensive regional data was at http://www.kadastr.ru/available_land_2008/. 
After Roskadastr was subsumed by Rosreestr, the website was no longer available. 
13 Formally, Roskadastr’s designation encompasses “lands for residential and commercial structures as well 
lands  for  industry,  transport  and  communications”  (земли  жилой,  общественно-деловой  застройки,  земли 
промышленности и общего пользования, а также транспорта, связи и инженерных коммуникаций, земли иного 
специального назначения). 
14 Within the Russian capital, after all, a good amount of land is given over to parks and largely un-
developed green spaces; within the city limits of St. Petersburg, roughly 20,000 hectares is designated as 
arable agricultural land. 
15 We explore but do not report a similar measure for industrial lands outside of population settlements, 
calculating the ratio between that owned by enterprises and that by government entities.    Across the 
RSFSR, this measure is 4.4%, or 67.5 thousand of 1526.5 thousand hectares; across regions, the correlation 
between it and our urban industrial land ownership index is 0.778. William Pyle and Koen Schoors  A ‘de Soto Effect’ in Industry? 
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3  Survey of large, urban, industrial firms 
 
To understand the effects of industrial land privatization, we collaborated with Moscow‟s 
Levada Centre to design and administer a survey of 359 large, urban industrial enterprises 
in the fall of 2009.16  Just under one fifth of the firms were in either Moscow or St. Peters-
burg, Russia‟s two largest cities.   The rest were distributed relatively equally across cities 
(each a capital of a territorial subject) of three different size ranges: 1 to 3 million; .5 mil-
lion to 1 million; and .25 to .5 million.  In all, the respondents represented 53 subjects (see 
Table 1). 
Respondents answered general questions regarding their firm as well as those spe-
cifically addressing land-related issues. A series of questions addressed the firm‟s primary 
production plot, with separate blocks designed for plots of different tenure status – i.e., pri-
vate, leased, or permanent (perpetual) use.17 Of survey respondents, 172 own their primary 
production plot; 131 lease and 56 hold it in perpetual use rights. Table 2 presents character-
istics of the enterprises, their primary production plots, and responses to questions regard-
ing financing, investment and barriers to operation. 
All respondents were asked to assess on a scale from 1 to 5, how problematic di f-
ficulties in accessing credit were to their operations (with 1 representing “not at all” and 5 
representing “extremely problematic”). As shown in Table 2, firms that hold their primary 
production plot under permanent (perpetual) use rights – the weakest form of tenure – are 
more apt to view credit access as a barrier than firms that own or lease their land. Like-
wise, these same firms are more likely to consider other problems a set of other potential 
problems – inadequate (own) working capital, overdue accounts receivable, government 
corruption and (non-property) taxes – as problematic.   
In response to a similarly-scaled question about investment activity at the enter-
prise in 2009, firms that owned their plot reported greater intensity; and firms operating 
under permanent (perpetual) use rights indicated less. Across plot-ownership-type groups, 
                                                 
16 Pilot surveys were administered in the summer of 2009. Of those firms contacted to participate in the sur-
vey, 429 refused categorically; 308 did not refuse outright but did not end up participating for one reason or 
another (e.g., the surveying organization had some difficulty in settling on a mutually convenient time); at 42 
firms, the necessary respondent was absent (e.g., due to illness or vacation); finally, 458 did not complete the 
survey because they did not make it through the filtering questions that related to their sector, ownership 
status, year of privatization and/or employment size.  
17 Another series of questions asked about up to three additional plots attached to the firm at the time of the 
survey. One more block focused on plots that had been seized or sold in the recent past. Finally, respondents 
answered a series of questions regarding the development of the land market in their regions. BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
BOFIT Discussion Papers 33/ 2011 
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however, we observe a rough similarity of responses to a question about the frequency of 
requirements to pledge land as collateral to secure external financing.  Of all firms, in fact, 
38.3% believe it is extremely common (5 on a 1-5 scale) for banks to require land as col-
lateral to secure access to external financing 
Several other features of the data in Table 2 strike us as noteworthy. At the time of the en-
terprises‟ privatization, over 80 percent of the plots – across all three groups – were at-
tached to the enterprise; a small minority of the plots under consideration, that is, was ac-
quired after privatization.18  Another point of similarity, firms in all three groups exper i-
enced, on average, steep drops in emplo yment after privatization.  Firms , however, that 
continue to operate under Soviet era land tenure rules were more likely to have larger plots. 
And Moscow is a clear outlier with respect to land tenure; relative to firms elsewhere, 
those in the capital were more likely to lease their land and less likely to hold it privately or 
under perpetual use rights. Finally, the ownership profile of firms varies across land tenure 
status. For instance, the ownership rights of foreigners in firms that hold their plots under 
perpetual use rights appear relatively weak; and the ownership rights of managers in firms 
that own their plots appear relatively strong.  
Among the firms that own their primary production plots, the median years for the privati-
zation of their enterprise and plot were 1993 and 2003,  respectively.  Two-thirds of these 
plots had been held in perpetual use prior to privatization, whereas the remainder had been 
leased. The transition from lease-holding to private ownership became more common after 
2001.  To purchase the plots, 67 (46.2%)  paid a percentage of cadastral value to purchase 
the plot (an average rate of 5.6%, median response of 2.5%); 41 (28.3%) paid the full c a-
dastral value; and 20 (13.8%) paid a factor of 3 to 30 greater than the land tax (an average 




                                                 
18 The median year of privatization was 1993. All had been privatized by the end of 2004. 90% of those sur-
veyed had been privatized prior to 2001 
19 A substantial majority of firms that own their plots report paying a 1.5% land tax rate; 28 pay less, with the 
low being 0.4%. The average of all firms that report a specific rate is 1.4%. William Pyle and Koen Schoors  A ‘de Soto Effect’ in Industry? 
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4  Plot tenure status, access to credit and  
  investment intensity 
 
To explore the micro-level effects of plot privatization more carefully, we employ a regres-
sion framework, testing the following specification, to investigate the determinants of ease 
of access to credit and investment intensity. 
 
  Ai,j = α + φTi + ζCi +γSi +βEi + εi  (1) 
The dependent variable Ai,j is the answer (expressed as the value of an ordered variable 
from 1 to 5) for the i
th firm to the j
th question (j=1 or 2). For j=1, the question addresses the 
degree to which difficulties with accessing credit pose a severe problem for the firm; Ai,j=5 
denotes a severe problem and Ai,j=1 denotes no problem at all.  For j=2, the question ad-
dresses the intensity of the firm‟s investment activity (on fixed capital, equipment, build-
ings and land) in 2009; Ai,j=5 denotes intense activity and Ai,j=1 denotes no activity at all.     
Ti represents the tenure status of the i
th firm‟s primary production plot whose en-
dogeneity we address later. In most specifications, Ti=1 if the plot is owned privately; 
however, in some, we include dummies that capture whether the plot is leased or held un-
der permanent (perpetual) use. Ci is a variable that captures the population of the city in 
which the firm is located. Si is a set of sectoral fixed effects. And Ei is a vector of other 
firm characteristics, including in all specifications the (log) number of years since the firm 
– not the plot – was privatized; the (log) number of full-time employees and the average 
assessment of the difficulty posed by four potential problems (in a manner similar to the 
dependent variable relating to difficulties accessing credit): taxes (not related to property), 
corruption,  overdue  accounts  payable  and  inadequate  (own)  working  capital.  In  some 
specifications, Ei includes characteristics of the primary production plot: including the area 
of the plot in (log) hectares and dummies for being located on the edge of the city, for be-
ing located proximate to at least two other enterprises, for being attached to the firm at the 
time of the firm‟s (not the plot‟s) privatization, for being the only plot attached to the en-
terprise at the time of the firm‟s (not the plot‟s) privatization and for being the designated 
the highest in terms of environmental hazard. And in yet other specifications, Ei also in-
cludes a dummy variable capturing the resopndent‟s status as a member of a commercial 
group (e.g., a financial-industrial group or a holding company) and ownership variables BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
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measuring on a 0-4 scale the ownership influence of foreigners, the State Property Fund 
and Russian individuals not employed by the firm.20   
Table 3 lays out the results from the “naïve” models which disregard the potential 
endogeneity of the plot‟s tenure status. We observe here a strong correlation between pri-
vate land ownership and both dependent variables. Across several different specifications, 
firms that do not own their plot report greater difficulty accessing credit and lesser invest-
ment intensity. Moreover, firms that hold their land under the least secure tenure status – 
permanent (perpetual) use – report more severe problems accessing credit than private land 
owners and comparatively little investment activity. All eight of these relationships are sta-
tistically significant, all but one at the 5% level. In other results, we observe that firms, 
which belong to commercial groups, which are located in larger cities and which have been 
privatized longer report less problems with accessing credit. 
Our results in Table 3, as was noted, do not address the likely edogeneity of the 
plot‟s tenure status. In Table 4, we introduce a strategy for rectifying this potential prob-
lem, which has been widely noted in the empirical literature devoted to assessing the ef-
fects  of  property  rights  (Besley,  1995;  Do  and  Iyer,  2008;  Field,  2005;  Galiani  and 
Schargrodsky, 2008; Hornbeck, 2010). Specifically, we use the regional urban, industrial 
land privatization index (Table 1) to instrument for the firm‟s plot status. The regional land 
policy that this variable captures is exogenous to the firm and plausibly can be excluded 
from the second stage of the IV-model since it is difficult to conceive of an alternate, un-
observed channel through which land policy might affect access to credit and investment 
intensity. 
Employing this approach, we observe that the regional land policy index strongly 
predicts private plot status across all specifications. Further, the second stage results show 
a statistically significant and negative relationship between the predicted value of private 
plot status and the severity of the self-reported problem with credit access. In other words, 
we find support for a “de Soto effect” in industry. As in Table 3, we observe a positive re-
lationship between private plot status and investment intensity but it is no longer statisti-
cally significant.  
 
                                                 
20 We lose a number of observations because of non-responses to the questions concerning the plot‟s area and 
the number of years ago that it was privatized. William Pyle and Koen Schoors  A ‘de Soto Effect’ in Industry? 
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5  Testing assumptions and exploring alternate data 
 
An important assumption above was that our regional land index did indeed represent the 
actual inter-regional policy variation that we described. Of course, the fact that we ob-
served in our IV models that surveyed firms were less (more) likely to have taken owner-
ship over their primary production plot in regions where the index of urban industrial land 
privatization was low (high), even after controlling for a number of firm and plot-specific 
characteristics, gives us confidence that the index captures what we have argued it does. 
But we can explore this assumption further by looking at survey responses concerning the 
obstacles confronted by firms that privatized their plots. Two oft-cited barriers – evaluated 
on a 1-5 scale in terms of their perceived severity – relate to barriers that regional officials 
may have put in the way of firms looking to take advantage of the opportunity to privatize 
their plots.  In Table 5, we explore the factors that influence how significant a barrier firms 
considered, first, opaque regulations and, second, outright opposition from the regional 
government. Controlling for the same firm and plot characteristics that we did in earlier 
models, as well as for other perceived barriers, we see that firms located in regions where 
the index of land privatization was high, firms were less likely to characterize opaque regu-
lations and government opposition as a more important barrier to plot privatization.21 Since 
outright resistance and unclear guidelines are two means by which sub -federal officials 
have thwarted the privatization of plots, we have even more reason to have confidence that 
our urban industrial land privatization index is measuring policy variation across space in 
Russia. 
The survey allows us to explore in more depth evidence for a “de Soto effect.” 
Specifically, firms that privatized their plots were asked the importance of a number of 
possible motives. Table 6 lays them out in order of popularity according to the percentage 
of respondents describing a motive as extremely important (i.e., a 5 on a 1-5 scale). The 
most frequently cited motive, irrespective of timing, was the promise of more secure prop-
erty rights (обеспечит большую защищенносeть бизнеса). Presumably also related to 
the security of property rights, the two next most popular responses relate to attracting fi-
                                                 
21 We control for the sum of the firm‟s responses to the other “barrier” questions so as to diminish the likeli-
hood that results are driven by unobserved variation in firms‟ willingness to respond with systematically 
higher or lower responses across all barriers. For instance in the government-opposition model, we control 
for the sum of each of the eight other responses; since respondents rank each barrier on a scale of importance BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
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nancial support. Over 40% of all firms that privatized their plots cited access to external 
lending and increased attractiveness of the property to investors as important reasons for 
purchasing their plots. These motives were even more popular among the firms that privat-
ized their plots after the passage of the Land Code in 2001 when financial markets were 
better developed. We interpret these responses as providing further evidence that legal title 
to land is indeed valued for enabling firms to access bank loans through facilitating the use 
of collateral.  
 
 
6  Conclusion 
 
Our interest in the tenure status of urban industrial land ultimately derives from an interest 
in the potential effects of formal changes in ownership. Do enterprises that own their plots 
behave differently than those that do not? Are they more likely to invest at greater rates? 
Do they have more success in accessing external finance? Are they more apt to sell or lease 
their lands for new purposes and thus promote urban de-industrialization and the adoption 
of land use patterns more typical of modern global cities?  
In this paper, we exploit a quasi-experiment that has been carried out in Russia. 
The tremendous inter-regional variation in the pace of land rights reform has meant that 
geography has helped determine the current tenure status of a firm‟s primary production 
plot as much as any individual firm characteristics. By exploiting the difference in the pace 
with which land reform has been carried out across Russia‟s federal subjects, we present 
evidence strongly consistent with the proposition that more secure rights to land facilitate 
access to external financing. This finding is confirmed by other evidence from our survey 
that points to the “de Soto effect” as an important motive for otherwise private firms to 






                                                                                                                                                    
from 1 to 5, this variable can take on a value from 8 to 40. A control was also included for whether or not the 
plot was privatized before or after 2002. William Pyle and Koen Schoors  A ‘de Soto Effect’ in Industry? 
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Table 1  Urban commercial-residential-industrial land owned by  
  firms relative to that by state & municipalities (%) 
 
    surveyed firms        surveyed firms 
Belgorod  24.9  6    Tver  2.2  2 
Vologoda  23.8   
  Tula  2.2  6 
Tatarstan  18.9  13    Krasnodar  2.2  5 
Lipetsk  14.8  10    Chukotka  2.2   
Novgorod  8.2  4    Sakha  2.1   
Orenburg  8.1   
  Oryel  2.0   
Kemerovo  7.4  5    Ingushetiya  2.0   
Tyumen  7.3  3    Samara  1.9  9 
Khakasiya  6.4   
  Krasnoyarsk  1.9  3 
Irkutsk  6.4  6    Bryansk  1.8  5 
Chuvash  6.0  2    Kaliningrad  1.7  3 
Sverdlovsk  6.0  17    Ivanovo  1.6  4 
Novosibirsk  6.0  3    Tambov  1.6  4 
Tomsk  5.5  8    Adygeya  1.6   
Smolensk  5.1  7    Altai k.  1.6  2 
Chelyabinsk  4.8  17    Udmurtia  1.5  4 
Leningrad  4.6  6    Buryatia  1.5  3 
Rostov  4.5  10    Arkhangelsk  1.4  4 
St. Petersburg   4.4  24    Murmansk.  1.4   
Karachevo-cherk.  4.4  1    Ulyanovsk  1.2  3 
Kirov  3.9   
  Chita  1.0   
Kurgan  3.9  2    Kabardino-Balk.  0.9   
Nizhny Novgorod  3.9  14    North Ossetiya  0.9   
Kareliya R.  3.7  2    Volgograd  0.8  9 
Vladimir  3.6  3    Mordovia  0.7   
Kursk  3.5  3    Penza  0.7  5 
Yaroslavl  3.3  8    Astrakhan  0.5  1 
Komi R.  3.3   
  Bashkortostan  0.5  11 
Stavropol  3.3  6    Sakhalin  0.5   
Primorye  3.3   
  Omsk  0.4  7 
Kaluga  3.1  5    Amur  0.4   
Ryazan  3.1  5    Moscow city  0.2  48 
Perm  2.8  13    Khabarovsk  0.1  2 
Marii El  2.7   
  Kalmykia  0.0   
Pskov  2.5  1    Altai r.  0.0 
  Kostroma  2.4  5    Tuva  0.0   
Daghestan  2.4   
  Kamchatka  0.0   
Voronezh  2.3  4    Magadan  0.0   
Moscow o.  2.3  1    Jewish A.O.  0.0   
Saratov  2.3  5    Chukotka  0.0   
 
Data source: http://www.kadastr.ru/available_land_2008/ and author’s survey. 
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Table 2  Characteristics of enterprise and primary production plot by land tenure status 
 
  Private  Lease  Perpetual  
use 
Credit access, collateral and investment intensity             
Degree to which difficulties accessing credit poses problem for 
firm (1-5 scale)  2.74    2.83    3.46  *** 
Degree to which problems with inadequate working capital, over-
due accounts receivable, corruption and (non-land) taxes pose 
problems for firm (1-5 scale) 
3.20    3.26    3.50  ** 
Intensity of investment activity in 2009 (1-5 scale)  2.84  *  2.66    2.22  ** 
Given your experience and that of business colleagues within re-
gion, how often do banks require land as collateral to secure long-
term financing? (1-5 scale) 
3.57    3.53    3.49   
Primary production plot             
Number of hectares  35.1    39.9    344.5  ** 
Only plot “on balance” of enterprise when enterprise privatized (%)  40.1    35.1    25.0  * 
“On balance” of enterprise when enterprise privatized (%)  82.0    78.6    76.8   
Being used at full capacity when enterprise privatized (%)  80.7    86.2    80.4   
Categorized as first category of environmental harm (%)  4.7    6.1    3.6   
Located on edge of city (%)  44.2    51.1    53.6   
More than two other enterprises in same part of city (%)  62.8    72.5  *  64.3   
Moscow (%)  1.2  ***  33.6  ***  3.6  ** 
St. Petersburg(%)  7.0    7.6    3.6   
City size (1-5 scale) (%)  3.0  ***  3.8  ***  3.0  * 
Other enterprise characteristics             
Employees at time enterprise was privatized  2209.8    2199.9    3156.8  * 
Employees in 2007  1430.0    1554.1    1981.5   
Years since enterprise was privatized  14.3    14.9    14.4   
Member of commercial group (FIG, holding, etc.) (%)  30.4    34.3    25.0   
Member of government corporation (%)  5.2    3.1    12.5  ** 
Influence of state property fund (0-4 scale)  0.35    0.35    0.53   
Influence of non-management labor (0-4 scale)  1.35    1.14  ***  1.32   
Influence of foreigners  (0-4 scale)  0.45    0.64  **  0.11  *** 
Influence of management  (0-4 scale)  2.36  ***  1.78  **  1.91   
Influence of other Russian individuals  (0-4 scale)  1.47    1.01  ***  1.82  *** 
Influence of other Russian enterprises  (0-4 scale)  1.17  **  1.56  **  1.41   
Number of respondents  172    131    56   
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Table 4  Plot tenure status, access to credit and investment intensity: an IV approach 
 
 
Accessing credit is  
severe problem  
(1-5 scale) 
Firm’s investment  
intensity, 2009  
(1-5 scale) 
Private ownership of primary production 
plot  -0.667*  -0.660*  -0.766**  0.476  0.233  0.331 
  (0.380)  (0.390)  (0.360)  (0.303)  (0.321)  (0.312) 
First stage: plot owned privately             
(Log) urban commercial-residential-
industrial land owned by juridical persons 
relative to that owned by state and locali-
ties 
0.717***  0.781***  0.850***  0.748***  0.815***  0.888*** 
(0.111)  (0.122)  (0.132)  (0.112)  (0.124)  (0.135) 
Sector controls  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Plot characteristics controls  No  Yes  Yes  No  Yes  Yes 
Owner controls  No  No  Yes  No  No  Yes 
N  329  295    318  284  264 
Prob>chi2  0.0000  0.0000    0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
IV models with ordered dependent variable (1-5 scale) and binary endogenous regressor. Used a “wrapper” 
program, ssm, that calls gllamm to fit such models (Miranda and Rabe-Hesketh, 2006).  ***, **, * difference sig-
nificant at 1%, 5% or 10% levels, respectively.  Standard errors, adjusted for clustering at regional level, in pa-
rentheses. Seven sector fixed effect controls. Plot characteristics controls: (log) area in hectares of primary pro-
duction plot; and dummies for location on periphery of city, location near at least two other enterprises, plot be-
ing only one on enterprise’s balance at the time of enterprise’s privatization; plot being on enterprise’s balance 
at the time of enterprise’s privatization, plot being designated as highest environmental hazard. Owner controls: 
ownership influence of state property fund, Russian individuals not employed by firm; foreign firms or individuals 
(all 0-4 scale).  
 
 
Table 5  Barriers to privatizing plot 




     
(Log) urban commercial-residential land owned by juridical rela-
tive to that owned by municipalities and government 
 
-0.249*  -0.437** 
(0.138)  (0.176) 
Sum of other “barrier” responses  0.121***  0.160*** 
  (0.021)  (0.020) 
Sector controls  Yes  Yes 
Plot characteristics controls  Yes  Yes 
Owner controls  Yes  Yes 
N  129  129 
Pseudo R2  0.2163  0.2964 
Ordered probit models. Robust standard errors, adjusted for clustering at regional level in parentheses. 
***, **, * significant at 1%, 5% or 10% levels, respectively. Other “barrier” responses refer to the sum of 
responses  to  similar  questions  relating  to  defining  and  agreeing  on  plot  boundaries,  inadequate  re-
sources (difficulty accessing credit), high cost of completing documents to purchase land, incomplete 
process of assigning land to appropriate government level, and absence of documents conferring rights 
to land. Other sector, plot characteristic and owner controls are similar to those in Table 3 and 4 specifi-
cations. William Pyle and Koen Schoors  A ‘de Soto Effect’ in Industry? 
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Table 6  Motives for privatizing primary production plot  
 
% of firms responding 5 on 1-5 scale with  
5=extremely important 
   
Increased security of property rights  62.4 
Increased asset value, investment attractive-
ness  48.2 
Increased access to credit  42.4 
Danger rental rate grows faster than land tax  30.0 
Rental rate greater than land tax  21.1 
Danger lease modified unfavorably  18.2 








Figure 1  Land held privately by firms in urban settlements (1000s of hectares) 
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